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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction was originally vested in the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to §78-2-2 (3) (j), U.C.A. (1953 as amended); however, 
pursuant to the authority vested in the Utah Supreme Court this 
case was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition 
on June 10, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did the court err in rendering summary judgment 
for the plaintiff while failing to consider equities favoring the 
defendant inasmuch as the evidence, when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the defendant, does not support a finding that there 
are no genuine issues of material fact? 
Standard of Review: Summary judgment requires that the 
evidence be viewed and all inferences be drawn in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. Billings v. Union Banker's 
Insurance Co. 819 P.2d 803 (Utah 1991); Ehlers Architects v. 
Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789 (Utah App. 1991) . Treloggon v. 
Treloggon, 699 P.2d 474 (Utah 1985). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter arises out of a lawsuit filed by the plaintiff, 
Clays S. Cutler through his guardian ad litem Mary Ellen Cutler, 
seeking the return of certain life insurance proceeds which were 
paid to the defendant, Linda Cutler, upon the death of defendant's 
husband, and Mary Ellen Cutler's ex-husband, Marlon S. Cutler. 
On January 5, 1993, the district court entered summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff ordering the return of life 
insurance proceeds previously paid to the defendant, and ordering 
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the defendant's home held in constructive trust to secure payment 
of the judgment. R.134. On January 8, 1993, the defendant filed 
a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and an Objection to Findings of 
Fact pursuant to Rules 52(b) and 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. R.144. The district court denied defendant's Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment on March 24, 1993, but, ordered that 
paragraphs 8, 11, and 12 of the court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law be amended to conform with the court's ruling of 
February 18, 1993. R.169. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on 
April 6, 1993, appealing the court's final Judgment entered January 
5, 1993, and subsequent Order Denying Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgement dated March 24, 1993. R.172. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Marlon S. Cutler and Mary Ellen Cutler were divorced pursuant 
to the Box Elder County District Court's Decree of Divorce entered 
August 24, 1989. R. 125. At the time of the divorce Mary Ellen 
Cutler and Marlon S. Cutler had a 13 year old child, Clay S. 
Cutler, born March 25, 1976. Pursuant to the parties stipulation 
and decree of divorce Marlon S. Cutler was ordered to pay Mary 
Ellen Cutler child support in the sum of $150.00 per month 
commencing September 1, 1989. (Addendum A, p. 2, 3). 
Approximately one week prior to the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce, Mary Ellen Cutler and Marlon S. Cutler entered a 
stipulation and property settlement agreement containing the 
following provision relating to certain life insurance proceeds: 
Paragraph 3(c)-Plaintiff and defendant agree that each 
will continue in force and effect any life insurance 
policies that each party currently has for the benefit of 
the minor child of the parties. R.125. 
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This life insurance language was also included in the findings of 
fact but was omitted from the Cutler decree of divorce. R.116, 
128. At the time of the divorce, Marlon Cutler had two policies of 
life insurance, one with Gem Insurance Company in the amount of 
$43,000.00, and the second with the Provident Life and Accident 
Company in the amount of $13,758.62. At the time of the divorce 
the Gem Insurance Company policy named the decedent's adult 
daughter, Mardi Ann Cutler, as the primary beneficiary and his 
minor son, Clay S. Cutler, as a secondary beneficiary. The primary 
beneficiary of the Provident Life and Accident Insurance Policy at 
the time of the divorce was the decedent's mother, Beth Cutler, and 
his minor son, Clay S. Cutler, was a secondary or alternate 
beneficiary. R.166. 
On November 22, 1989, the decedent changed the named 
beneficiary on the Provident Life and Accident insurance policy 
from the decedent's mother to his adult daughter, Mardi Ann Cutler, 
and his minor son, Clay S. Cutler, as co-beneficiaries. R. 166-
167. In July of 1990, the decedent changed the Provident Life and 
Accident insurance naming his second wife, defendant Linda Cutler, 
as primary beneficiary and his minor son, Clay Cutler, as secondary 
beneficiary. In July of 1990, the decedent changed the beneficiary 
on the Gem State insurance policy to his second wife, defendant 
Linda Cutler, as primary beneficiary while his minor son, Clay S. 
Cutler, remained as secondary beneficiary. R.167. 
The district court in entering its summary judgment in favor 
of plaintiff found specifically based on the Affidavit of Mary 
Ellen Cutler's former attorney, Thomas L. Willmore, that the 
decedent Marlon S. Cutler read, discussed, and understood the 
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contents and terms of divorce stipulation and findings of fact and 
was therefore bound by the terms and provisions of the stipulation 
although the provisions were omitted from the decree of divorce. 
R.128. The district court also found that whether the defendant 
was aware or unaware of the language of the stipulation and 
findings of fact was of no consequence and that her right's could 
not be enlarged by the fact of her marriage. R.128. Furthermore, 
the court found that the insurance policies were not part of the 
estate of decedent Marlon S. Cutler, that whether or not the 
plaintiff, Clay S. Cutler, received Social Security benefits had no 
relevance, and that there was no indication that the insurance was 
to provide for the minor child only in lieu of child support. 
R.120, 130. 
The court entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
ordering that the insurance proceeds be immediately delivered to 
the plaintiff and applied to the total judgment. The court ordered 
that the defendant's real property be held in constructive trust to 
remain free and clear of any liens and encumbrances pending payment 
of the insurance proceeds to the plaintiff. In addition, the court 
ordered that interest be paid on the insurance proceeds at the rate 
of ten percent (10%) per annum from and after the defendant 
received the insurance proceeds until the date of judgment and 
thereafter at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum. R. 134-
137. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff while failing co consider equities favoring the 
defendant inasmuch as the evidence was insufficient to support a 
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finding that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Since 
the language of the divorce stipulation and property settlement 
agreement is unclear the trial court must examine the underlying 
intent of the parties relative to the disposition of insurance 
proceeds. The stipulation did not identify a specific policy of 
insurance nor did it declare an amount of coverage expected to be 
maintained for the benefit of the minor child. At the time of the 
divorce the minor child was only an alternate or secondary 
beneficiary of each policy. Since the decedent acted to change the 
name of the primary beneficiary, the trial court's conclusion that 
the decedent fully understood the terms and provisions of the 
stipulation cannot be supported when viewing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the defendant. 
The evidence and affidavits presented to the trial court fail 
to prove the decedent's intent regarding the disposition of life 
insurance proceeds. The affidavits contain hearsay and opinion 
evidence which is inadmissible and legally insufficient to justify 
the court's ruling since neither affidavit clarifies the 
ambiguities contained in the stipulation nor resolves factual 
issues raised by the decedent's actions in changing the named 
beneficiaries on the insurance policies. 
Given the ambiguity of paragraph 3(c) of the divorce 
stipulation, and given the decedent's actions in changing the named 
beneficiaries, it is clear that the decedent intended to provide 
for his second wife in the event of his death. The cumulative 
effect of the language contained in the child support and insurance 
paragraphs of the divorce stipulation coupled with the fact that 
the decedent changed the name of the primary beneficiary of each 
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insurance policy to the defendant leads to the conclusion that the 
decedent and his former wife had different understandings as to the 
effect of paragraph 3(c) of the stipulation. Given the evidence of 
the decedent's intent to provide for the defendant in the event of 
his death, the trial court erred in failing to consider equitable 
evidence and arguments which may favor an award of all or part of 
the proceeds to the defendant. Furthermore, since the trial 
court's ruling results in manifest injustice to the defendant, the 
Utah Court of Appeals may fashion a remedy of its own in accordance 
with the demands of justice. The defendant contends that the 
judgment should be reversed and the proceeds of the life insurance 
policies awarded to the defendant or at a minimum the case remanded 
to the trial court for further hearing with instructions to divide 
the insurance proceeds equitably. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RENDERING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT SINCE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THERE ARE NO GENUINE 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. 
Since summary judgment denies a party a trial on the merits, 
the appellate court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the non-moving party and should affirm a summary judgment only 
where it appears that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material facts, or even in light of the facts as contended by the 
loosing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Themv v. Seagull Enters, Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979) . 
Briaas v. Hoi comb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987) . Hunt v. ESI 
Engineering, Inc., 808 P.2d 1137 (Utah App. 1991). Furthermore, 
since an appeal of the summary judgment presents for review only 
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the trial court's conclusions of law because by definition summary 
judgments do not resolve factual issues, the appellate court 
reviews those conclusions for correctness without according 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Bonham v. 
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989) . TransAmerica Cash Reserve, Inc. 
v. Dixie Power and Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990) . Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 
184 (Utah 1991). 
A. THE AFFIDAVITS AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
LEAVE SEVERAL ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT UNRESOLVED. 
The proper approach in determining the disposition of the 
proceeds of the decedent's life insurance policies requires that 
the court view the property settlement agreement and the decree 
confirming it, as the court would a contract. See Lock v. Lock, 8 
Ariz. App. 138, 444 P. 2d 163 (1968) . Using this approach the court 
should first look to the language of the contract or stipulation. 
If the language is clear the court need go no further. If however, 
the language is unclear the court must examine whatever evidence 
available to determine the parties' intent. Crozier v. Equitable 
Life Assurance Society, 658 P.2d 39 (Wash. App. 1983); See also, 
White v. Michigan Life Ins. Co., 43 Mich. App. 653, 204 N.W. 2d, 
772 (1972) . 
In the case at hand the language of paragraph 3(c) of the 
stipulation and property settlement agreement is less than clear 
since it did not specifically name an insurance policy or an amount 
of the coverage expected to be maintained. Furthermore, since the 
parties' minor son was only an alternate beneficiary of the 
policies at the time of the divorce and since the decedent changed 
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the names of the primary beneficiaries on each policy it is 
arguable that the decedent maintained no insurance for the benefit 
of the minor child at the time of the divorce and intended only 
that the primary beneficiaries use the policy proceeds for his 
son's support in the event of death. 
In paragraph 8 of the district court's Amended Findings of 
Fact, the court states: 
The affidavits of Mr. Thomas L. Willmore and Mary Ellen 
Cutler with accompanying attachments indicate that the 
deceased read and discussed the contents, terms, and 
provisions of not only the stipulation but likewise the 
findings. As to that aspect the court finds that the 
deceased was bound by the terms and provisions of the 
stipulation which he obviously read and signed and by the 
findings just as if the provisions were found in the 
decree. 
The court's findings contained in paragraph 8 are wholly 
unsupported by the affidavits of Thomas Willmore and Mary Ellen 
Cutler which clearly do not state that Mr. Cutler read or discussed 
the contents, terms, and provisions of the stipulation and findings 
entered in the divorce action. These affidavits fail to provide 
any competent evidence as to Mr. Cutler's understanding and intent 
as it related to paragraph 3(c) of the stipulation and paragraph 
6(c)(3) of the findings of fact. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence in the affidavits sufficient to support a finding or 
conclusion that the deceased understood the stipulation regarding 
life insurance. To the contrary, the Willmore affidavit indicates 
that the deceased appeared in Mr. Willmore's office and signed the 
stipulation in front of his secretary only. (Addendum F, p. 2). 
Contrary to the trial court's Memorandum Decision, the fact 
that the decree of divorce did not contain the language found in 
the stipulation and findings relative to the maintenance of 
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insurance for the parties' minor child is significant in that the 
decedent's actions in changing the policy beneficiaries 
demonstrates that the parties' intent regarding disposition of the 
life insurance was unclear. The decedent's actions in changing the 
named primary beneficiaries of the policies as outlined in 
paragraph 11 and 12 of the court's Amended Findings of Fact 
indicate that Marlon S. Cutler's understanding was clearly 
different than that of Mary Ellen Cutler. In addition, the 
decedent's actions seem contrary to the court's conclusions in 
paragraph 15 of the Findings of Fact that the parties knew or 
understood the policies of insurance they had and intended to 
continue in the future for the benefit of the minor child. 
At the time of the divorce the decedent's adult daughter, 
Mardi Ann Cutler, was the primary beneficiary of the $43,000.00 Gem 
Insurance Company policy and the decedent's minor son, Clay S. 
Cutler, was only a secondary beneficiary. The decedent's mother, 
Beth Cutler, was the primary beneficiary of the $13,758.62 
Provident Life and Accident insurance policy, and his minor son, 
Clay S. Cutler, was a secondary or alternate beneficiary. R.166-
167. Three months after the divorce in November 1989, the decedent 
changed the named beneficiary on the Provident Life and Accident 
policy from his mother to his adult daughter while maintaining his 
minor son as a co-beneficiary. This action alone casts grave doubt 
on the trial court's conclusions that the decedent and his former 
wife knew and understood which policies of insurance were intended 
to continue in the future for the benefit of the minor child. 
Furthermore, exactly what each party understood "for the benefit" 
to mean is also unclear. 
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In July of 1990 the decedent further changed the primary 
beneficiary of the Provident policy to his second wife, Linda 
Cutler while his minor son Clay Cutler remained a secondary 
beneficiary. In July of 1990, the decedent also changed the name 
of the primary beneficiary of the Gem Insurance Company policy to 
his second wife, Linda Cutler, while his minor son, Clay Cutler, 
remained as secondard beneficiary. Clearly the decedent's changing 
of the named beneficiaries when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the defendant cannot lead to the conclusion that the decedent 
fully understood the terms and provisions of the stipulation and 
findings in the divorce when in fact the terms are ambiguous. An 
equally likely conclusion is that the decedent intended only that 
sufficient policy proceeds be used to provide for his son's support 
during his minority and that the decedent's second wife be the 
beneficiary of the remaining proceeds. Alternatively the decedent 
may have intended only that the Provident policy be maintained for 
his minor son while the Gen Policy be maintained for his second 
wife. 
B. THE AFFIDAVITS OF MARY ELLEN CUTLER AND THOMAS L. WILLMORE 
ARE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT FAILING TO PROVE DECEDENT'S INTENT. 
The affidavit of Mary Ellen Cutler is inconclusive as to the 
deceased's intent regarding disposition of all life insurance 
proceeds and is largely based on hearsay and opinion evidence which 
is inadmissible. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify.... 
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Contrary to Rule 56(e), neither the Willmore affidavit nor the Mary 
Ellen Cutler affidavit provide a factual basis for the court's 
findings based on personal knowledge. The affidavits contain 
hearsay and opinion testimony reflecting unsubstantiated 
conclusions and fail to state sufficient evidentiary facts to allow 
the court to determine as a matter of law that there are no genuine 
issues of material fact remaining to be decided. See Walker v. 
Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973) ; Williams 
v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985); Norton v. Blackum, 669 P.2d 
859 (Utah 1983). 
Specifically the affidavit of Thomas L. Willmore states that 
all information he received for the divorce action came from Mrs. 
Cutler, that he did not receive any information from Mr. Cutler nor 
did he have any discussions or negotiations with Mr. Cutler or 
anyone representing him. R.109. The affidavit further states that 
Mr. Cutler appeared in Mr. Willmore's office and signed the 
stipulation only in front of his secretary, Marie Riggs. R.110. 
The affidavit of Mary Ellen Cutler contains hearsay statements 
relating to her discussions with her former husband which are 
inadmissible as to the ultimate issue before the court and 
insufficient to justify the court's ruling since the statements do 
not clarify the ambiguity of the stipulation nor resolve the 
factual questions raise by the decedent's actions changing the 
named beneficiaries on the policies. R.98-100. (See also, 
Addendums F, p. 1, 2; and G, p. 1, 2, 3) . While the affidavits 
provide the court with a general understanding of how the divorce 
was procedurally undertaken, they do not provide the court with 
sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusions 
11 
regarding the decedent's intent and understanding of paragraph 3(c) 
of the stipulation. 
ARGUMENT 
II. DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AWARDED THE PROCEEDS OF 
THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES SINCE THE 
DECEDENT'S DESIGNATION OF THE DEFENDANT AS 
BENEFICIARY UNDER THE POLICIES IS A CLEAR 
INDICATION OF THE DECEDENT'S INTENT TO VEST A 
PROPERTY RIGHT IN THE DEFENDANT. 
In Culbertson v. Continental Assurance Co., 631 P.2d 906 (Utah 
1981) the Supreme Court of Utah set forth the rule regarding the 
disposition of insurance proceeds which have been the subject of 
property settlement agreements between spouses. The general rule 
provides: 
General expressions or clauses in [property settlement 
agreements] are not to be construed as including an 
assignment or renunciation of expectancies; Therefore, 
a beneficiary retains his status under an insurance 
policy or will if it does not clearly appear from the 
agreement that in addition to the segregation of the 
property of the spouses it was intended to deprive either 
spouse of the right to take property under the will or 
insurance contract of the other. 
In Culbertson, the decedent's second wife brought an action to 
have proceeds of a profit sharing plan and certain insurance 
policies awarded to the decedent's estate rather than to the 
decedent's first wife as his designated beneficiary. The Supreme 
Court ruled that the decedent's first wife was entitled to the 
proceeds of the profit sharing plan and insurance since the 
decedent neither changed the designated beneficiaries nor sought an 
explicit relinquishment of his first wife's expectancy interest. 
Furthermore, the court ruled that where there were no broad 
comprehensive provisions in the decree which could reasonably be 
construed as a relinquishment or waiver of the first wife's 
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expectancies, and where the decree did not expressly terminate her 
status as beneficiary she was entitled to the proceeds. Id. at 
913, 914. 
The Culbertson court categorized the types of cases which 
commonly give rise to claims made by former spouses on insurance 
policies in which the former spouse is a designated beneficiary. 
The first involves a property settlement agreement or decree of 
divorce in which a spouse relinquishes any claim to ownership of 
the policies and agrees to execute any documents to sever such 
interest. The rule in such cases is that unless the decree or 
property settlement agreement explicitly waives the expectancy 
interest, the former spouse is entitled to receive the proceeds as 
a designated beneficiary since the courts emphasize the decedent's 
right to change the beneficiary if he so desires. The second group 
of cases involves insurance policies not specifically mentioned in 
the property settlement agreement or decree of divorce where there 
are provisions effecting a complete settlement of the parties' 
property interests and awarding each all right, title, and interest 
in his or her respective property. The rule in these cases is that 
an agreement with such general provisions is deemed merely to 
effect a division of the parties' property and the court cannot 
reasonably infer from such language that the spouse has released an 
expectancy interest as a beneficiary under his former spouses 
insurance policy. In the third group of cases, the language of the 
property settlement agreement or decree of divorce is sufficiently 
comprehensive to establish clearly that the spouse has waived or 
relinquished any expectancy interest. In such cases the decree of 
divorce eliminates the former spouse's interest in proceeds of a 
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life insurance policy. 
The facts of the present case seem to fall within the second 
category of cases described in Culbertson except that the plaintiff 
in the present case had no expectancy interest. Such interest, if 
any, was "for the benefit of minor child". However, the 
stipulation is not sufficient to specifically grant an expectancy 
interest in all of the proceeds since the minor son was merely a 
secondary beneficiary of both policies at the time of the divorce. 
A further complicating factor is that the decedent clearly acted to 
change the named primary beneficiary of each policy to the 
defendant prior to his death. 
In Culbertson, the court indicated that since there was no 
waiver of the defendant's expectancy interest in the decree the 
following rule was applicable: 
In consequence of the fact that ordinarily divorce does 
not affect the right of the named beneficiary, it follows 
that where the husband does not change the beneficiary of 
his policy after having been divorced, the divorced wife 
is entitled to the proceeds of the policy upon the death 
of the insured. Id. at 914 citing 5 Couch on Insurance 
2d, §29:4, P.267 
In the case at hand there was no specific waiver of the expectancy 
interest contained in the stipulation. However, exactly what that 
expectancy interest was is far from clear. The relevant language 
of the stipulation falls squarely within the paragraph entitled 
"Child Support and Insurance". (Addendum A, p. 2,3). There are 
four paragraphs under the child support and insurance portion of 
the stipulation. Paragraph one deals with the monthly child 
support obligation which the decedent was required to pay, the 
manner in which it was to be paid, and is reflective of the gross 
income of each of the parties used in the calculation of child 
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support. Paragraph two deals with the parties' obligation to 
maintain medical and dental insurance for the minor child. 
Paragraph three contains the language giving rise to the present 
litigation regarding the life insurance policies. Paragraph four 
contains the provision for automatic withholding of income in the 
event of the non-payment of child support. 
The facts of the present case differ significantly from 
Culbertson in that the decedent in the case at hand did in fact 
change the name of the primary beneficiary on the insurance 
policies in question. The Culbertson court ruled that there was no 
triable issue of fact since the decedent failed to change the named 
beneficiary. The fact that the decedent in the case at hand 
changed the named beneficiaries is indicative of the decedent's 
intent to provide for his second wife and demonstrates that the 
decedent did not understand the terms and conditions of paragraph 
3 (c) of the stipulation as the trial court ruled in its Memorandum 
Decision. The case at hand is further complicated by the fact that 
the decree of divorce, which arguably is the document upon which 
the decedent relied in making any decisions regarding the insurance 
policies, did not contain the dispositive language of paragraph 
3(c) of the stipulation. 
In light of the foregoing facts, the trial court's findings in 
paragraph 15 that the decedent and Mary Ellen Cutler knew and 
understood what policies of insurance they had and intended to 
continue in the future for the benefit of the minor child, along 
with the fact that the child's receiving Social Security benefits 
has no relevance are inequitable and contrary to the evidence. 
Arguably the language contained in paragraphs 3 (a), (b), (c), and 
15 
(d) of the stipulation when read for its cumulative effect 
indicates that the decedent intended to provide a way in which the 
plaintiff could continue to have a sufficient means of support 
during Clay Cutler's minority. The cumulative effect of the 
language contained in the child support and insurance paragraphs, 
coupled with the less than clear language contained in paragraph 
3(c) of the stipulation, and the fact that the decedent changed the 
name of the primary beneficiary of each policy to the defendant, 
lead to the conclusion that the decedent intended to provide for 
his second wife in the event of his death. This being the case, 
the trial court erred in failing to consider equitable evidence and 
arguments which may favor an award of all or part of the proceeds 
to the defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
III. SINCE THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING RESULTS IN 
MANIFEST INJUSTICE TO THE DEFENDANT, THE 
COURT OF APPEALS MAY FASHION ITS OWN REMEDY 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DEMANDS OF JUSTICE. 
It is long been held that in equity cases the appellate court 
is charged with the review of both the facts and the law and may 
where the occasion warrants substitute its own judgment for that of 
the trial court to fashion a remedy according to the demands of 
justice where the trial court's disposition of the matter results 
in manifest injustice. Jackson v. Jackson. 616 P. 2d 338 (Utah 
1980); Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P. 2d 1017 (Utah 1982) . Furthermore 
this court may substitute its own judgment for that of the trial 
court and fashion it own remedy according to the demands of 
justice. Jackson at 340. 
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The trial court failed to consider competing equities between 
the parties in rendering its decision. Specifically, the trial 
court indicated that the fact that Social Security benefits were 
being paid to the plaintiff was irrelevant. The trial court did 
not consider the relative needs of the parties nor the obvious 
intention of the decedent to provide for his spouse by designating 
her as the named beneficiary. All of these factors coupled with 
the overall language of the stipulation urge at a minimum more 
equitable division of the life insurance proceeds. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the fact that the standard of review for a motion for 
summary judgment requires that the evidence be viewed and all 
inferences be drawn and considered in a light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, defendant contends that the evidence presented to 
the trial court is insufficient to justify the court's ruling. The 
judgment should therefore be reversed and the proceeds of the life 
insurance policies awarded to the defendant, or at a minimum the 
case should be remanded to the trial court for further hearing with 
instructions to divide the life insurance proceeds equitably 
between the parties. 
DATED this *£ day of October, 1993. 
CHRISTOPHER^L. SHAW 
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant 
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P. 0. Box 115 
Tremonton, Utah 84337 
Telephone: (801) 257-3885 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
MARY ELLEN CUTLER, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
MARLON CUTLER, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION 
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COMES NOW the Plaintiff and the Defendant and in 
consideration of the mutual convenants and conditions herein set 
forth, the parties do stipulate, contract and agree one with the 
other as follows: 
WHEREAS, the Plaintiff has filed a Complaint for divorce; 
and 
WHEREAS, the parties are desirous of stipulating and 
agreeing each with the other concerning the property and rights 
of the parties on the issues of child custody, visitation, child 
support, medical insurance, medical expenses, life insurance, 
alimony, division of property, division of debts, retirement 
plans and attorney's fees, and the parties respectfully request 
the Court to approve and grant the provisions of said agreement 
and incorporate them in any Divorce Decree which may be issued, 
Number 
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NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereby agree with the other as 
follows: 
1. Divorce. Plaintiff shall be granted a Decree of Divorce 
from the Defendant on her Complaint, said Decree to become final 
upon signing by the Court. 
2. Custody and Visitation. During the course of their 
marriage, the parties have had two (2) children born as issue of 
their marriage, namely: CLAY S. CUTLER (born 3/25/76) and MARDI 
ANN CUTLER (born 10/11/69). Plaintiff and Defendant stipulate 
and agree that they shall have joint custody and control of the 
minor child, Clay S. Cutler. The parties agree that Plaintiff is 
to be the primary custodial parent with the minor child residing 
with her and Defendant is to be the secondary custodial parent 
with liberal and reasonable visitation rights. 
The parties agree that if the minor child decides he wants 
to reside with Defendant, and it is in the minor child's best 
interest, and if Plaintiff, Defendant the the minor child are in 
agreement, then he may reside with Defendant without this Court 
issuing another order and Defendant's child support obligation 
shall terminate while the minor child is residing with Defendant. 
However, if the minor child resumes residing with Plaintiff, then 
Defendant's child support obligation shall be reinstated as set 
forth in paragraph 3. 
3. Child Support and Insurance. 
(a) Defendant agrees to pay to Plaintiff as and for the 
support and maintenance of the minor child, the sum of $ 1150.00 
per month until said child reaches the age of majority or 
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graduates from high school, whichever is later. Said monthly 
child support payment shall be paid in equal installments to 
Plaintiff so that one-half '(1/2) is paid on or before the 5th day 
of each month and the other one-half (1/2) is paid on or before 
the 20th day of each month. Said child support payment of 
$150.00 per month is based upon Plaintiff's current monthly 
gross income of $1875.00 and Defendant's current monthly gross 
income of $1670.00. 
(b) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that both parties will 
maintain medical and dental insurance upon the minor child of 
« 
the parties when it is available through their employment or any 
other future employment. Plaintiff and Defendant stipulate that 
each shall be equally responsible for one-half (1/2) of the 
deductible and any uncovered medical and dental expenses. 
(c) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that each will continue 
in force and effect any life insurance policies that each party 
currently has for the benefit of the minor child of the parties. 
(d) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the withholding of 
income is hereby authorized as a means of collecting child 
support pursuant to U. C. A. Section 78-45(d)-1 et.seq. Such 
withholding will only occur if Defendant is delinquent in child 
support as defined in Section 78-45(d)-1(4). This provision will 
remain effective until Defendant no longer owes child support to 
Plaintiff. 
4. Real Property. Plaintiff and Defendant agree that 
during the course of their marriage they have acquired a home 
r-3885 
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located at 607 South Tremont, Tremonton, Utah, which is more 
particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point North 88 41! East, 4097 feet from the 
Northwest corner of the Southwest quarter of Section 10, 
Township 11 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian and 
running thence South 155.3 feet, South 89 1.5' East 348 
feet; thence North 14 15' West 70 feet; thence North 62 
35' East 228 feet crossing river; thence South 88 41f West 
532 feet to the point of beginning, containing 1.64 acres. 
The parties stipulate and agree that Defendant is to have the 
home as his sole and separate property. Plaintiff and Defendant 
agree that there is approximately $30,000.00 of equity in the 
home. Defendant agrees to pay to the Plaintiff one-half (1/2) of 
said equity interest or $15,000.00, which shall be paid by 
Defendant to Plaintiff on or before August 1, 1992. Defendant is 
not obligated to pay interest on said obligation. Defendant 
agrees to execute a Promissory Note and Trust Deed securing the 
payment of said amount to Plaintiff. If Defendant sells the home 
at a fair market value within three years of the date of divorce, 
then Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the equity from the sale 
shall be split equally between them and Defendant does not have 
an obligation to pay the $15,000.00 as stated above. Equity for 
purposes of this document regarding the sale of the home is 
defined as the sales price minus mortgage to Fireman's Fund, 
realtor fees and closing costs. 
5. Personal Property. Except as set forth herein, the 
parties have effected to their mutual satisfaction a division of 
all other personal property in which they had an interest, either 
singularly or jointly. 
(a) Plaintiff shall have the following items of [visonal 
property as her sole and separate property: 
love seat wood rocking chair 
brown La-Z-Roy chair dining room set 
microwave washer & dryer 
floor mirror end tables 
hanging lamp lawn mower 
(upstairs) scanner 
vacuum cleaner wall decor and knick-knacks 
1/2 of dishes, (except wood clock) 
pots and pans, 1977 Euick Skylark 
towels and bedding 
(b) Defendant shall have the following items of personal 
portable T. V. 
dishwasher 
freezer 
phone seat 
gas grill 
smal 1 appliances, 
property as his sole and separate property: 
Refrigerator Bedroom set 
La-Z-Boy chair Console T. V. 
Front room wall mirror wood clock 
barn scene entry walls 
saws (chain) hanging lamp 
1/2 of dishes, (downstairs) 
pets and pans, 1979 Chevrolet truck 
towels and bedding hand tools 
horse tack one horse 
cou^h 
VCR 
cowboy pictures 
lawn mower 
camping gear 
horse trailer 
power tools 
saddles 
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(c) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the 1988 Prowler 18-
foot travel trailer be sold or refinanced by Defendant to remove 
Plaintiff's obligation therefrom. If the trailer is sold, 
Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the proceeds from the sale 
are to be applied to the loan obligation for the trailer. 
6. Payment of Debts and Obligations. Plaintiff agrees to 
pay the following debts and obligations and to indemnify and hold 
Defendant harmless therefrom: Visa, Discovery Card, Bon Marche, 
G.E.C.A.F., Weinstocks, vacuum cleaner purchase, First Security 
Bank, and any and all debts and obligations incurred 
individually by her since the date of separation on or about July 
1, 1989. 
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Defendant agrees to pay the following debts and obiigat ions 
and to indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom: 
Firemanfs Fund house mortgage (approximately $38,500.00), cash 
reserve with First Security Bank, Visa, Quick-Line First 
Security, Greentrec Financing and Bank One, and any and all debt 
and obligations incurred individually by him since the date of 
separation on or about July 1, 1989. 
7. Retirement or Pension Funds. The parties acknowledge 
that Plaintiff has a retirement or pension fund through her 
employment with Thiokol Corporation and that Defendant has a 
retirement or pension fund through his employment with Utah Stat 
Retirement. The parties stipulate and agree that each party shal 
have his or her retirement or pension fund as his or }v-:r sole an 
separate property and that neither party shall claim any interes 
in the other party's pension or retirement fund. Each party 
forever waives any claim to either party's pension or retirement 
funds. 
8. Preparation of Documents. It is expressly understood 
between the parties that this Stipulation has been prepared by 
Plaintiff's attorney who is Thomas L. Willmore. Defendant 
acknowledges that Plaintiff's attorney has explained to him his 
right to retain independent legal counsel or such other advice c 
he may deem in his best interest to review the Stipulation and 
the terms, provisions and conditions thereof and that this 
Stipulation is entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant aftf-
having received such advice and counsel and after having made 
such examination as he deems in his best interest. 
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9 . Attorney's Fees and Costs of Court. Th e pa r 1; j e s 
stipulate and agree that each shall be responsible for the 
attorney's fees and costs of Court that each has incurred in t.his 
matter, if this divorce is obtained upon this Stipulation. 
Should a default arise under this Stipulation and its terms, the 
Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the party creating the default 
agrees to pay all costs and reasonable attorney's fees to resolve 
the dispute or enforce the terms and conditions of this 
Stipulation. 
10. Duty to Cooperate. Both parties agree to execute and 
deliver to the other party, within thirty clays of the'date of 
entry of the Divorce Decree, if any, any and all documents and 
other property necessary to effect the intent of this 
Stipulation. 
11. Voluntary Contract. Plaintiff and Defendant 
acknowledge that they execute this Stipulation of their own free 
will and choice, believing it to be in their best interest and in 
the best interest of the parties' minor child. 
12. Disclosure. Each of the parties acknowledge that a 
full and complete disclosure of all property and debts incurred 
or acquired during their marriage has been made and should other 
assets or debts later be discovered, an equitable order would 
have to be entered at such time. 
13. Waiver. Defendant, by his signature, hereby enters his 
appearance in this matter and specifically waives any further 
notice of the proceedings herein, and does hereby consent that 
Plaintiff may take judgment for divorce as prayed for in her 
Complaint, provided the provisions of said Decree correspond wit 
the provisions of this Settlement Agreement. 
DATED this lju day of M y , 1989. 
Hh 
DATED this \&-
rikuift1A\ (;/////4 
Mary M i e n C u t l e r 
day of e*rf^, 1989. 
^f)\p l\r^ \ .jjtcA 
Marlon Cutler 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
MARY ELLEN CUTLER, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs . 
MARLON CUTLER, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
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This matter came on for hearing at 1 o'clock p.m. on August 
21, 1989, in the Court Room in the Hall of Justice at Brigham 
City, Box Elder County, Utah, the Honorable F.L. Gunnel! 
presiding. The Plaintiff was present in person and was 
represented by her Attorney, Thomas L. Willmore, of the Law Firm 
of OLSON & HOGGAN. The Defendant was not present in person and 
was not represented by counsel. Plaintiff was sworn and 
testified, and the Court having heard the testimony, and being 
fully advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1. Plaintiff, MARY ELLEN CUTLER, is hereby awarded a 
Decree of Divorce from Defendant, MARLON CUTLER, the same to 
become final and absolute the date of entry hereof. 
2. The Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby awarded the joint 
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care, custody and control of the minor child of the parties, 
namely: CLAY S. CUTLER, (born 3/25/76). Plaintiff is awarded 
the primary custody of the minor child residing with her and 
Defendant is awarded the secondary custody of the minor child 
with liberal and reasonable visitation rights. 
3. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to the Plaintiff as 
and for child support the sum of $150 per month for the minor 
child commencing September 1, 1989, and payable one-half (1/2) on 
or before the 5th cf each month and the other half on or before 
the 20th of each month. 
4. It is hereby ordered that the parties home located at 
60 7 South Trejnont, Tremonton, Box Elder County, Utah, which is 
more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point North 88 41f East, 4097 feet from the 
Northwest corner of the Southwest quarter of Section 10, 
Township 11 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian and 
running thence South 155.3 feet, South 89 151 East 348 
feet; thence North 14 15f West 70 feet; thence North 62 
35f East 228 feet crossing river; thence South 88 41f West 
532 feet to the point of beginning, containing 1.64 acres. 
shall awarded to Defendant subject to a $15,000.00 lien to 
Plaintiff. Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff her equity 
interest of $15,000.00 on or before August 1, 1992. If Defendant 
sells the home at a fair market value within three (3) years of 
the date of divorce, then the equity is ordered to be divided 
equally between Plaintiff and Defendant. Equity is defined as 
the sales price minus mortgage to Fireman's Fund, realtor fees 
and closing costs. 
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the personal property now in 
her possession, love seat, brown La-Z-Boy chair, microwave, floor 
2 
mirror, hanging lamp (upstairs), vacuum cleaner, 1/2 of dishes, 
pots and pans and towels and bedding, wood rocking chair, dining 
room set, washer & dryer, end tables, lawn mower, scanner, wall 
decor and knick-knacks (except wood clock) 1977 Buick Skylark, 
portable T.V., dishwasher, freezer, phone seat, gas grill, small 
appliances, together with all personal property and personal 
effects which she owned prior to marriage. 
6. Defendant is hereby awarded the personal property now in 
his possession, refrigerator, La-Z-Boy chair, front room wall 
mirror, barn scene, saws (chain) 1/2 of dishes, pots and panss, 
and towels and bedding, horse tack, bedroom set, console T.V., 
wood clock, entry walls, hanging lamp (downstairs), 1979 
Chevrolet truck, hand tools, one horse, couch, VCR, cowboy 
pictures, lawn mower, camping gear, horse trailer, power tools, 
saddles, together with all personal property and personal effects 
which he owned prior to marriage. 
7. Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby ordered to maintain 
health and dental insurance upon the minor child of the parties 
through their employment or any other future employment. 
Plaintiff and Defendant shall equally be responsible for the 
deductible and any uncovered medical expenses. 
8. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to assume and pay the 
following debts and obligations and shall indemnify and hold 
kHOGGAN 
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 9. Defendant is hereby ordered to assume and pay the 
3 
following debts and obligations and shall indemnify and hold 
Plaintiff harmless therefrom: Fireman's Fund house mortgage 
(approximately $38,500.00), cash reserve with First Security 
Bank, Visa, Quick-Line First Security, Greentree Financing and 
Bank One, and all debts and obligations incurred individually by 
him since the date of separation. 
10. It is hereby ordered that neither Plaintiff nor 
Defendant shall have any right or claim for alimony from the 
other, because each has waived any rights because of their 
ability to provide income for themselves. 
11. Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby awarded their own 
pension or retirement fund that each has acquired with their 
employer, and each party has waived any cl.aim that they 
may have in the other parties1 pension or retirement fund. 
12. Each party is hereby ordered to be responsible for any 
attorney's fees that each has incurred in this matter. 
13. Each party is hereby ordered to immediately execute and 
deliver one to the other all documents and property necessary to 
effectuate this Decree of Divorce. 
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DATED t h i s ,j^ / day of August, 1989 
BY THE COURT: 
/S/RL. GUNNEL! 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Decree of 
Divorce upon the Defendant by mailing a true and correct copy 
thereof, postage prepaid in Tremonton, Utah, to the Defendant, 
Marlon Cutler, 607 South Tremont, Tremonton, 84337, this 
c^ /" day of August, 1989. 
Sec/reta 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLAY 3. CUTLER, by and through ] 
MARY ELLEN CUTLER, his ' 
guardian, ] 
Plaintiffs ] 
vs. ] 
LINDA CUTLER, 
Defendant . ] 
1 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1 CASE NO. 920000013 
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE the Court on a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Most of the issues addressed, in the respective 
parties' memoranda were addressed in detail in court on a 
hearing conducted the 9th day of October, 1992. 
At that hearing both parties submitted, by proffer and 
argument, the facts of the case and both admitted that the 
Court would not benefit by further testimony. In addition, the 
Defendant, in her Responsive Memorandum, accepts the facts as 
stated in the Plaintiff's Memorandum. 
This becomes pertinent in any Motion for Summary Judgment, 
but in particular here because the Court is called upon to 
Interpret and apply certain language found in the Stipulation 
and Findings. The Defendant has argued that because of 
ambiguities, all the facts must be considered in that 
construction. The Court will operate on the premises that all 
Cutler vs. Cutler 
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pertinent facts are before it now and that a full trial would 
not enlighten the Court further thereon. 
Of some interest is that the operative provisions in the 
Stipulation relative to the insurance .benefits were found 
likewise in the Findings, but# apparently through oversight 
omitted, from the Decree. The Defendant has argued that the 
Deceased was not therefore bound thereby or at the least he may 
not have been aware of the language as people would ordinarily 
only review the Decree of Divorce and not the Findings. The 
Affidavit of Mr. Thomas L. Willmore indicates that the Deceased 
read and discussed the contents, terms and provisions of not 
only the Stipulation but likewise the Findings. As to that 
aspect, this Court holds that the Deceased was bound by the 
terms and provisions of the Stipulation, which he obviously 
read and signed and by the Findings just as if the provisions 
were found in the Decree. 
Of other minor concern is with respect to the knowledge, if 
any, by the Defendant of the restriction on the Deceased 
relative to his handling of the insurance policies and the 
named beneficiaries. The proffer was made that she was unaware 
of the restriction. 
The rights of the Defendant cannot be enlarged by the fact 
of her marriage, nor her understanding or lack of understanding 
Cutler vs. Cutler 
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with respect to the restrictions and provisions in the 
Stipulation and Decree of Divorce. There could be some 
argument made that since she was married to the Deceased at the 
time of his death and that equity should work in her favor and 
that the Court should find her to be the lawful beneficiary of 
the policies. This case concerns both contract law and 
equity. Contract in the Stipulation and between the Deceased 
and the Plaintiffs guardian and contract between Deceased and 
the insurance companies. Equity, of course, comes in to play 
with respect to the Divorce Decree in its entirety, the 
application of fairness with respect to the treatment of the 
language in the Stipulation and Findings and its effect upon 
the child, together with the claims by the Defendant for equity 
relative to her relationship to the Deceased. Moreover, it is 
equity which the Plarntiff seeks in having the funds taken from 
the Defendant and provided for the minor child. 
The language of the Stipulation and Findings may be argued 
to be less than entirely clear, in that it could be interpreted 
to mean that the parties will agree to continue in force and 
effect any life insurance policies which each party then had 
for the benefit of the minor child of the parties. The 
question then being whether that means that the policies if any 
would continue in force as they then were, where the minor 
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child or children was then named beneficiarys or whether the 
policies that existed were to remain in effect, not as they 
perhaps then existed, but in the future for the benefit of the 
minor parties necessitating a change in the named beneficiary 
of the policies. 
The notes of Attorney Willmore indicate that the only 
policy referred to was that provided by the State [the Gem 
State Insurance Policy] of $43,000,00. The Provident Life and 
Accident Policy may or may not have been included, but was not 
mentioned in the notes. The facts however are that apparently 
at the time of the Decree, the named beneficiary was the 
Plaintiff's guardian, with the children being the contingent 
beneficiaries. The intent seems to be clear that the parties 
intended, subsequent to the Decree, that only the minor child 
of the parties be named beneficiary. As clear as that may be, 
there are other matters less so. One question which may arise 
is what is to be done pursuant to the Stipulation once the 
minor child reaches the age of majority. Nothing in the 
Stipulation provides guidance, but it could perhaps be argued 
that once the minor child reaches the age of majority, the 
restriction on the Deceased's right to change beneficiaries is 
then lifted. 
A few months after the Decree was entered and not entirely 
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consistent with the Decree, the named beneficiary was changed 
from the Plaintiffs guardian to the two (2) children of the 
parties, one being an adult. Later and subsequent to the 
Deceased's remarriage to the Defendant, the adult child was 
deleted and the Defendant and the minor child were named. The 
Defendant has argued that since the Deceased first named both 
children as beneficiaries, he obviously did not understand the 
terms and provisions of the Stipulation, After the remarriage, 
the deletion of the adult child would indicate however to the 
contrary. 
Some argument was made of the fact that at the time of the 
divorce there was a policy providing coverage on the life of 
the minor child. The Court finds that to be irrelevant, as 
that is of no benefit to the minor child, but likely for the 
benefit of the parents only. 
This Court's task then is to determine what was meant and 
understood by the parties and then what powers in law and/or 
equity should be exercised to enforce those intentions. In 
that regard the Court finds that the fact that the Deceased was 
not represented by counsel, has no relevance, as he was 
considered to be competent and able to understand the 
Stipulation into which he entered. The notes of Attorney 
Willmore and his Affidavit would confirm the same. Further, 
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paragraph 8 of the Stipulation is dispositive. 
As to the lack of specificity in the Stipulation and in the 
Findings raising a question as to whether or not the policy was 
then in force or actually what was being referred to in the 
language/ the Court presumes that the parties knew and 
understood what policies of insurance they had and intended to 
continue in the future for the benefit of the minor child. 
The suggestion that the policies constituted the extent of 
the "estate" of the Deceased is not only inaccurate, [as they 
were not part of the "estate"], but irrelevant. Likewise that 
the receipt by the child of social security benefits has no 
relevance, nor is there any indication that the insurance was 
to provide for the minor child only in lieu of child support. 
That was however, likely part of the thinking of the parties, 
but it does not change or affect the decision of the Court. 
Although the Court is not insensitive to the concerns of 
the Defendant, and the hardship caused by the loss of the 
insurance benefits, the Court must/ by equity, do what should 
have been done. After considering the various factors in this 
case and for the reasons set forth in the Plaintiff's 
Memorandum is Support of the Motions for Summary Judgment, the 
Supplemental Memorandum, together with Affidavits is support 
thereof and for the reasons set forth hereinabove, the Motion 
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for Summary Judgment is granted in the favor of the Plaintiff, 
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare a formal 
Judgment and Order in conformance herewith. 
Dated this 17th day of November, 1992. . 
BY THE COUPT 
£ 
"Gordon J. Low 
District Court Judge 
Case No: 920000013 CV 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify that on the V day of • ' • . ' ( / / / • ' • •,/ i 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the 
attached document to the following: 
REED HADFIELD 
Atty for Plaintiff 
P.O. BOX 876 
BRIGHAM CITY UT 84302-0906 
QUINN D HUNSAKER 
Atty for Defendant 
102 SOUTH FIRST WEST 
P 0 BOX 461 
BRIGHAM UT 84302 
District Court Clerk 
By: • f'U-r/y^A-XyJqtev^ 
rDeputy Clerk 
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Reed W. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thome #1289 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main 
P. O. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLAY S. CUTLER by and through ; 
MARY ELLEN CUTLER, his 
Guardian, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
LINDA CUTLER, ] 
Defendant. ; 
I FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I Civil No. 920000013CV 
This matter having come on regularly for oral arguments 
before the above-entitled court on the 9th day of October, 1992 
before the Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Judge, pursuant to a 
Motion for Summary Judgment having been filed by the plaintiff; 
each of the parties having been given the opportunity to submit 
memoranda and authorities in support of their position and the 
Judge of said court, after taking said matter under advisement, 
has made and entered his written Memorandum Decision granting the 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and pursuant thereto the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law constituting 
( m A 1993 
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the decision of the court are hereby made and entered on Motion 
of Reed W. Hadfield, attorney for the plaintiff: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The plaintiff, Clay S. Cutler, is the minor child of 
Mary Ellen Cutler and Marlon Cutler. On August 21, 1989 the 
above-entitled court granted to Mary Ellen Cutler a Decree of 
Divorce from Marlon Cutler, said case being Civil No. 890000384. 
The Findings of Fact entered by the court on the same date 
contain the following: 
"(3) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that each will 
continue in force and effect any life insurance 
policies that each party currently has for the benefit 
of-the minor child of the parties." 
2. The Decree and Findings were based upon a Stipulation 
entered into between said parties, which Stipulation was signed 
by Mary Ellen Cutler dated the 14th day of August, 1989 and by 
Marlon Cutler dated the 15th day of August, 1989 and which 
Stipulation contained the following: 
"(c) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that each will 
continue in force and effect any life insurance 
policies that each party currently has for the benefit 
of the minor child of the parties." 
3. During the month of August, 1989 at the time the 
Stipulation was entered into and at the time the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Decree were entered by the court, 
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Marlon S. Cutler had in effect two life insurance policies on his 
life, which policies were as follows: 
(a) Gem Insurance Company in the amount of 
$43,000.00 (see copy of letter from Utah Retirement 
Systems - R. Scott Hansen dated June 17, 1992, attached 
to plaintiff's Memorandum as Exhibit 1). 
(b) Provident Life and Accident Company in the 
amount of $13,758.62 (see copies of letters from Utah 
Retirement System - Sherrie Archibald attached to 
plaintiff's Memorandum as Exhibit 2). 
4. Marlon S. Cutler aka Marlon Cutler died January 11, 
1992. 
5. On or about January 28, 1992 Gem Insurance Company paid 
to Linda Cutler, -deceased's present wife, the sum of $43,000^00 
representing life insurance death benefits on the life of Marlon 
S. Cutler aka Marlon Cutler (see defendant's Answers to 
plaintiff's Interrogatories). 
6. On or about February 27, 1992 Provident Life and 
Accident Company paid to Linda Cutler, deceased's present wife, 
the sum of $13,758.62, being life insurance proceeds on the life 
of Marlon S. Cutler aka Marlon Cutler (see defendant's Answers to 
plaintiff's Interrogatories). 
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7. On the 28th day of February 1992 the above-entitled 
court entered an Order on Order to Show Cause which provided in 
effect, as follows: 
(a) That the $43,0000.00 that was the life 
insurance proceeds received from Gem Insurance Company 
had been invested in a home to the extent of 
$41,424.25, which home is described as: 
Lot 3, Block 9, Plat A, Tremonton Townsite Survey. 
The balance of said insurance proceeds had been used to 
pay the funeral and burial expenses of Marlon S. Cutler 
aka Marlon Cutler. That the home and real property was 
placed in a constructive trust in accordance with the 
provisions of said Order. 
(b) Any additional life insurance proceeds that 
were received on the life of Marlon S. Cutler aka 
Marlon Cutler were to be placed in an interest bearing 
bank account and to be held in a constructive trust and 
not to be withdrawn except upon further Order of the 
court •* 
(c) That the sum of $13,758.62 received from 
Provident Life and Accident Company has been placed in 
an interest bearing account at First Security Bank in 
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accordance with the court Order (see defendant's 
Answers to plaintiff's Interrogatories). 
8. The Affidavit of Mr. Thomas L. Willmore indicates that 
the deceased read and discussed the contents, terms and 
provisions of not only the Stipulation but likewise the Findings. 
As to that aspect the court finds that the deceased was bound by 
the terms and provisions of the Stipulation which he obviously 
read and signed and by the Findings just as if the provisions 
were found in the Decree. 
9. The court finds that whether the defendant was aware or 
was unaware of the restrictions found in the Stipulation and 
Findings of the divorce is of no consequence. The rights of the 
defendant cannot be enlarged by the fact of her marriage, nor her 
understanding or lack of understanding with respect to the 
restrictions and provisions in the Stipulation and Decree of 
Divorce. 
10-. The court finds that this case concerns both contract 
law and equity. 
11. The notes of Attorney Willmore indicate that the only 
policy referred to was that provided by the state (the Gem State 
insurance policy) of $43,000.00. The Provident Life and Accident 
policy may or may not have been included, but was not mentioned 
in the notes. The facts are, however, that apparently at the 
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time of the Decree the named beneficiary was the plaintiff's 
guardian with the children being the contingent beneficiaries. 
The intent seems to be clear that the parties intended subsequent 
to the Decree that only the minor child of the parties be named 
beneficiary. 
12. The court finds that a few months after the Decree was 
entered and not entirely consistent with the Decree the named 
beneficiary was changed from the plaintiff's guardian to t*\e two 
(2) children of the parties, one being an adult. Later and 
subsequent to deceased's marriage to the defendant the adult 
child was deleted and the defendant and the minor child were 
named. The court finds that since the deceased first named both 
children as beneficiaries, and that after his remarriage he 
deleted the adult childf that this indicates that the deceased 
did understand the terms and provisions of the Stipulation. 
13. The court finds that whether or not there was a policy 
providing coverage on the life of the minor child is irrelevant 
as that is of no benefit to the minor child but likely for the 
benefit of the parents only. 
14. The court finds that the fact that the deceased was not 
represented by counsel has no relevance as he was considered to 
be competent and able to understand the Stipulation into which he 
entered. The notes of Attorney Willmore and his Affidavit would 
6 
Cutler vs. Cutler 
Findings and Conclusions 
confirm the same. Further, paragraph 8 of the Stipulation is 
dispositive. 
15. The court finds that the parties knew and understood 
what policies of insurance they had and intended to continue in 
the future for the benefit of the minor child. 
16. The court finds that the insurance policies were not a 
part of the estate of the deceased. 
17. The court finds that the receipt by the child of* social 
security benefits has no relevance, nor is there any indication 
that the insurance was to provide for the minor child only in 
lieu of child support. 
18. The court finds after considering the various factors 
in this case for the reasons set forth in the plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Supplemental Memorandum, together with Affidavits in support 
thereof, and for the reason set forth in the court's Memorandum 
Decision, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in favor of 
the plaintiff. 
19. That there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. 
AS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FROM THE FOREGOING FACTS THE COURT 
FINDS: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. That a judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant for the life insurance proceeds that have 
previously been paid to the defendant on the life of Marlon 
Cutler, which life insurance proceeds are as follows: 
(a) Gem Insurance Company in the amount of $43,000.00. 
(b) Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company in 
the amount of $13,758.62. 
2. The life insurance proceeds that have been placed in an 
interest bearing bank account and are being held in a 
constructive trust and not to be withdrawn except upon further 
order of this court are hereby ordered to be delivered to the 
plaintiff immediately and said amount to be applied to the above 
judgment. 
3. That the home and real property that has been acquired 
by the defendant and which is located in Box Elder County, Utah 
and more particularly described as follows, to-wit: 
Lot 3, Block 9, Plat A, Tremonton Townsite Survey. 
Together with all rights belonging thereto, 
which is being held in a constructive trust pursuant to an Order 
on Order to Show Cause on the express conditions that the home is 
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to remain free and clear of all liens and encumbrances and no 
lien or encumbrance is to be placed upon said property until the 
further Order of this court, shall remain in said constructive 
trust and the express conditions contained therein that the home 
remain free and clear of all liens and encumbrances and no lien 
or encumbrance be placed against said property, are to continue 
in full force and effect. The defendant is given ten (10) days 
from the entry of judgment within which to pay the entire • 
proceeds of $43,000.00 to the plaintiff. In the event said sum 
is not paid within said ten day period, the plaintiff shall be 
entitled to either obtain an Execution or to proceed without an 
Execution to have said home sold, with the defendant to execute 
the necessary documents to complete the sale and the proceeds of 
sale shall be applied to the judgment hereinabove set forth. 
4. That interest at the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum 
shall be paid on said insurance proceeds from the date said 
insurance proceeds were received by the defendant (which dates 
would have been on or about January 28, 1992, on the $43,000.00 
and on or about February 27, 1992, on the $13,758.62) until date 
of judgment and at the rate of twelve (12%) percent per annum 
from date of judgment until paid. 
Let judgment be entered accordingly. 
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DATED this 'Y day of December, 199ji. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the within Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law this / 7 day 
of December, 1992, to the defendant's attorney, Quinn D. 
Hunsaker, Molgard and Hunsaker, 102 South 1st West, P. O. Box 
461, Brigham City, Utah 84302 and to Linda Cutler, 40 East 100 
North, Tremonton, Utah 84337 (Attorney Quinn Hunsaker having 
filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel dated December 8; 1992). 
/$/ faro. Uf\CJ(^nA / 
• • . • •' U I I I I L II • * * « • * • ! I ' < » l ' ' I M I SECRETARY y J 
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Reed W. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne #1289 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 723-34 04 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
il ^J 
CLAY S. CUTLER by and through 
MARY ELLEN CUTLER, his 
Guardian, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LINDA CUTLER, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
Civil No. 920000013CV 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and 
Order entered by this court on January 5, 1993 shall remain in 
full force and effect except that paragraphs 3, 11 and 12 of said 
Findings shall be amended to read as follows: 
M8. The Affidavits of Mr. Thomas L. Willmore and 
Mary Ellen Cutler with accompanying attachments 
indicate that the deceased read and discussed the 
contents, terms and provisions of not only the 
Stipulation but likewise the Findings. As to that 
aspect, the court finds that the deceased was bound by 
the terms and provisions of the Stipulation which he 0)Q/t 1fZ 
MICROFILMED 
P a t t ^ ^ R o l l No. /£-_, 
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obviously read and signed and by the Findings just as 
if the provisions were found in the Decree. 
11. Neither the Gem State insurance policy for 
$43,000.00 nor the Provident Life and Accident 
insurance policy for $13,758.62 were specifically 
referred to in the notes of Attorney Thomas Willmore. 
Both policies were, however, provided by the State and 
the notes of Thomas Willmore stated: "Life 
insurance - - both will maintain for benefit of 
Clay - - Mary Ellen's with Thiokol - - Marlon's with 
State." At the time of the Divorce Decree (August 21, 
1989), the primary beneficiary of the $43,000.00 Gem 
State insurance policy was Mardi Ann Cutler, the 
decedent's daughter, who was over the age of majority. 
The decedent's minor son, Clay S. Cutler, was the 
secondary beneficiary. The named beneficiary at the 
time of the Divorce Decree on the $13,758.62 Provident 
Life and Accident insurance policy was the decedent's 
mother, Beth Cutler, and his minor son, Clay S. Cutler, 
was the secondary or alternate beneficiary. 
12. The court finds that on or about November 22, 
1989 the decedent changed the named beneficiary on the 
Provident Life and Accident insurance policy from 
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decedent's mother to his adult daughter, Mardi Ann 
Cutler, and his minor son, Clay S. Cutler, as co-
beneficiaries. In July of 1990 decedent changed the 
Provident Life and Accident insurance in the sum of 
$13,758.62 to his second wife, Linda Cutler, as primary 
beneficiary and his minor son, Clay Cutler, as 
secondary beneficiary. At the time of the divorce 
Mardi Ann Cutler was the named beneficiary of the 
$43,000.00 Gem State term insurance policy while the 
decedent's minor son, Clay S. Cutler was a secondary 
beneficiary. In July of 1990 the decedent changed the 
beneficiary on the Gem State insurance policy in the 
sum of $43,000.00 to his second wife, Linda Cutler, as 
primary beneficiary while his minor son, Clay S. 
Cutler, remained as secondary beneficiary. 
DATED this Mj day of March, 1993^" / ^ ' ) 
''s sis? 
APPROVE 
^STRICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the within Amanded Findings of Fact this ffim day of March, 
1993, to the defendant's attorneys, Findley P. Gridley and 
Christopher L. Shaw, Gridley, Ward, Hamilton & Shaw, 635 25th 
Street, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
tr/11:cutler.afd 
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AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS L. WILLMORE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Box Elder ) 
THOMAS L. WILLMORE, being first duly swornf deposes and says: 
1. That I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the 
State of Utah. 
2. That in July and August, 1989f I was contacted and 
retained by Mary Ellen Cutler regarding a divorce action she wanted 
to file against her husband, Marlon Cutler. 
3. I was first contacted by Mrs. Cutler on July 6f 1989. She 
came to my office and I met with her. 
4. I had another conference with Mrs. Cutler on July 7, 1989 
« 
in which I discussed with her the issues involved in a divorce 
action. 
5. One of the issues that I discussed with Mrs. Cutler was 
her life insurance and Mr. Cutler's life insurance being maintained 
for the benefit of their minor child, Clay Cutler. My notes of 
July 7, 1989 indicate as follows: "Life insurance—both will 
maintain for benefit of Clay—Mary Ellen's with Thiokol—Marlon's 
with State." 
6. This is the only reference in my notes concerning life 
insurance and it is my recollection that I discussed with Mrs. 
Cutler that the life insurance of both Mr. and Mrs. Cutler would be 
maintained for the benefit of their minor child, Clay Cutler. 
7. All information that I received for this divorce action 
was from Mrs. Cutler. I did not receive any information from Mr. 
Cutler and I did not have any discussions or negotiations with Mr. 
Cutler or anyone representing him. 
8. On August 14, 1989, I received a telephone message from 
Mrs. Cutler asking that I proceed to have the divorce action filed 
and set for a default hearing. After I spoke with her, I prepared 
a Stipulation incorporating the information she had provided to me. 
9. I reviewed the Stipulation with Mrs. Cutler in detail and 
she was in agreement with all of the provisions set forth in the 
Stipulation. 
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10. Mrs. Cutler appeared in my office and signed the 
Stipulation on August 14, 1989 in front of my secretary, Leslie 
Morrison, who is a Notary Public. 
11. Mr. Cutler appeared in my office and signed the 
Stipulation, Promissory Note and Trust Deed on August 15, 1989 in 
front of my secretary, Marie Riggs, who is Notary Public. 
12. A default divorce hearing was held on August 21, 1989 
before the Honorable F. L. Gunnell. On that date, Judge Gunnell 
signed and entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce. 
13. On August 21, 1989, I prepared a letter addressed to Mr. 
Cutler at 607 South Tremont Street, Tremonton, Utah 84337, and 
« 
mailed the letter together with copies of the Decree of Divorce, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order to Withhold and 
Deliver. I indicated in my letter to him that the divorce was 
heard on August 21, 1989 and that if he had any questions or 
problems concerning the documents that he needed to contact his 
attorney immediately. A copy of my August 21, 1989 letter is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
14. Further the Affiant sayeth not. * 
Ttfibmas L. Willmbfe 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of October, 
1992. ^cs^5355*^ 
/%2€\ #fe^ fan, 
f / T» t? \ t) NOTAW PUBLIC A 
9Wi*jLi! Residing at: Tremonton, Utah 
\ Va, .cfl-/ a Commission Expires: 11-22-92 \dVNb 22. V>Xv J? 
cutlr)tlw.aff/tlw 
EXHIBIT "A" 
O L S O N 6 H O G G A N 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
L. BRENT H O G G A N 
MILES P. JENSEN 
BRUCE L. JORGEN5EN 
BRAD H. BEARNSON. P C 
THOMAS L WILLMORE 
MARLIN J GRANT 
Of COUNJtt 
W I L U A M L FILLMORE 
CHARLES P. OLSON (191*1975) 
August 21, 1989 
56 W E S T CENTER 
P O BOX 525 
LOGAN. UTAH 64321 
TELEPHONE (601) 751 1551 
TELEFAX (601) 753 8699 
T R E M O N T O N OFHCE. 
183 EAST MAIN 
P.O BOX 115 
T R E M O N T O N . U T A H 64337 
TELEPHONE (601) 157 -3665 
Marlon Cutler 
607 South Tremont 
Tremontonf Utah 84 337 
Re: Cutler vs. Cutler 
Our File No. T-1165 
Dear Mr. Cutler: 
Enclosed you will find conformed copies of the following 
documents: Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law & Order to Withhold and Deliver. The divorce was heard on 
August 21, 1989, and Judge Gunnell signed these documents. Please 
review these documents, and if you have any questions or problems 
with them you need to contact your attorney immediately. 
Sincerely, 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Thomas L. Willmore 
TLW/lm 
encs 
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Reed W. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thome #1289 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLAY S. CUTLER, by and ; 
through MARY ELLEN CUTLER, 
his Guardian, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
LINDA CUTLER, ] 
Defendant. ] 
| AFFIDAVIT OF MARY ELLEN 
CUTLER nka MARY ELLEN | BUTLER 
) Civil No. 920000013CV 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER ) 
Mary Ellen Cutler nka Mary Ellen Butler being first duly 
sworn deposes and says: 
1. I am the natural mother of Clay S. Cutler and the duly 
appointed guardian ad litem of Clay S. Cutler, who is the 
plaintiff in the above-entitled action. 
2. Prior to contacting Attorney Thomas L. Willmore in early 
July of 1989, Marlon Cutler and myself discussed obtaining a 
divorce. We discussed the possibility of entering into a 
Property Settlement Agreement• It was decided at that time that 
both parties would keep in effect all of their present life 
insurance policies for the benefit of the minor child, Clay S. 
Cutler. Various other terms and conditions were agreed upon. On 
or about July 6th or 7th, 1989 I contacted Attorney Thomas L. 
Willmore concerning obtaining a divorce for me from my husband, 
Marlon Cutler. 
3. In my discussions with Attorney Willmore I advised him 
as to the things we had agreed upon, including the fact that each 
of us were to maintain our present life insurance policies, which 
life insurance policies were to be maintained for the benefit of 
our only minor child, Clay S. Cutler. Attached hereto as Exhibit 
,fAff is a copy of a letter to Marlon Cutler from the Utah State 
Retirement Board dated July 21, 1989. This letter was during the 
time the Property Settlement Agreement was being worked out and 
was prior to Marlon's signing the Stipulation on August 15, 1989. 
4. Marlon and I had several discussions concerning what 
would be in the best interests of Clay and what Marlon felt would 
be fair to him financially. 
5. We both agreed to maintain medical and dental insurance 
on Clay. We both agreed to maintain our present life insurance 
policies for the benefit of Clay. Our discussions were 
specifically that each of us would maintain for the benefit of 
Clay all life insurance policies that each of us had in effect at 
that time. (See copy of Attorney Thomas L. Willmorefs notes 
attached hereto as Exhibit lfBlf) . 
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6. I agreed to accept $26.00 less a month from what was 
calculated on the Child Support Obligation Worksheet (see copy of 
worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit "C"). I further agreed to 
not require any alimony and we both agreed that each would retain 
our own retirement benefits even though his retirement benefits 
were greater than mine. 
7. All of the terms and conditions of our stipulation were 
negotiated and agreed to between us and various adjustments and 
concessions were made by each of us to the other in arriving at 
all of the terms and conditions of said stipulation. 
8. The entire stipulation was a "give and take" arrangement 
on the part of both parties and the stipulation that was finally 
signed represented the final agreement after all of the terms and 
conditions had been worked out. 
9. I had carefully considered all of the terms and 
conditions of the stipulation, as had Marlon, and firmly believed 
that all of said terms and conditions were important to me. The 
life insurance was an important provision for me as I was most 
concerned about the welfare of Clay S. Cutler. 
Further affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this /y day of October, 1992. 
MARY /ELLEN CUTLER nka 
MARY ELLEN BUTLER 
3 
On the /? day of October, 1992 personally appeared before 
me Mary Ellen Cutler nka Mary Ellen Butler, the signer of the 
within instrument who duly acknowledged to me that she executed 
the same. 
^y^-
feSi. 
NOTARY nnuc » 
^
? b ^ K REEDW.HADFIhLD 
''V£\i\ 98 North Main 
5#l'i7 StateclUtan 
"<l.-S-y MyComm.Expires1/3/91 
tr/1:cutler.aff^ 
,/V 9fJ,JJ,J 
NbTARY PUBLL-
Residing a^Brigham City, Utah 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the /? day of October, 1992 I 
hand delivered a true and correct copy of the within Affidavit of 
Mary Ellen Cutler kna Mary Ellen Butler to the defendant's 
attorney, Quinn D. Hunsaker at Molgard & Hunsaker, P. 0. Box 461, 
Brigham City, Utah 84301. 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES GROUP INSURANCE 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
230 South 500 East. Suite 260 EXHIBIT "A" 
Salt Lake City. UT 84102 
(801)363-2002 
BERTD. HUNSAKER 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
July 21, 1989 
Marlon S. Cutler 
607 South Tremont 
Tremonton, UT 84337 
Dear Insured: 
In checking our life insurance records, it has been determined that you 
do not have an enrollment card in file for the Gem Life Insurance. It 
is essential that a current enrollment card with your beneficiary is in 
our office for you. 
Payroll records show you have the basic $18,000 provided by the'State, 
additional term in the amount of $25,000 for a total of $43,000 
You do do not X have dependent coverage. 
Return the completed card to the above address no later than 8/4/89 
REMEMBER IT IS ESSENTIAL YOU COMPLETE THIS CARD AS ALL STATE EMPLOYEES 
HAVE LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS. Be sure to mark all information. 
Thank you for your cooperation, 
Kathleen Anderson 
Life and Accident Benefits Manager 
Note: If possible please obtain a new card from your payroll clerk. 
THOMAS L. WILLMORE'S NOTES 
7/7/Zf ^r^o^/M^/^^ Cu^/en 
ft/< 9TX: -&>r , y- — ^ / ^ ^ J?^ 
Lo<w -£> /^7n?**toi 77"s~/~ "" -?9<4i 
bO 7 5< 7re***&n'J~ 5T~, 
Jar tf/d^Le s<?ys /^i/^d, &/ 
<£, nM<— /V^ry £l//&7) U//// *<**£ /t'*< 
J, 
'4 
7, /3/r. C/ciy Sr ?/**y7£ 
—B^T 
/ -
w, 4P* 
3. Q*?Mf"*- -^W-r/. fosr/w/y ^ 
?o? S 2-CO UJ 
/ r&"L0u*'f&i 
/ 
EXHIBIT * C * 
m ? y BTT.PM HITLER. 
v s . 
MARLON CUTLER 
IN THE FTRST 
ROY ELDER 
DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(SOLE CUSTODY) 
C i v i l NO. 
IASE 
T. 
IT 
2b. 
AWARD CALCULATION 
"inter the number of children of this mother ana 
father for whom support is to be awarded. 
fnler t^e father-s and mother's gross monthly income. 
Refer to ^ ^ t i o n s fo- i-lnlhlon of income. 
|^~-p1^o-u7ly ordered alimony that is actuaixy 
ITll !DO ~+ «nfr alimony ordered for this case). . 
•;;rier previously ordered child support. (Do not enter 
rSTSSdlfication and paternity actions only Enter 
the amount from Line 12 of the Present radii 
worksheet for the non-custodial parent. j_ 
fCbtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is tne ,, 
justed u ^ h l y Gross fc- - " " support purposes; 
-
Rrlr,s i., x, <„ Mno 3 and the number 
Mother 
/////////// 
/////////// 
///////////I 
.1875-
I-
0 
1875 
4 . 
7~. 
Adjusted Monthly Gross for cnna Buppon. K.m.H^ "~~- . ... 
Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of \l 111II11111 
children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the !/////////// 
Base Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here. \l 1111111111 
Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3| 
by the COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. | 
Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain i$ 
each parent's share of the BaBe Support Obligation. | 
Enter the child(ren)'s portion of monthly medical and|-
dental insurance premiums paid to insurance company. ' 
53 
199 
F a t h e r i Combin* 
.1670 
Mill/// 
Mil III/ 
Mllllll 
Ml IIIII 
Mllllll 
\l11 III I 
_0 
"MlI, III 
Mllllll 
Mllllll 
1670 
///////////IS 
I III IIIIIll\ 
l l l l l l l l f l l 
1 5545 
375 
47 
Mlllll, 
Will III 
223. 
M/llfl 
Ml fill 
Mill II 
Mlllll 
! ' • ~ ^JSTSTE. .
 te <He ObU,or p,~n<. e~«l»- to ! . „ , 
*^VT7-'--"--7~"- -• «-"d ' " « E " ^ 
',9. BASE AMOUNT PER CHILD 
! Divide Line 8 by Line 176 
EXTENDED VISITATION 
d
" ^ ' " " ' "-" . r r ; ; ! for a" t e a e t 2 5 o f . „ 30 executive d,ys. 
